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COMMENTARY
German Council on Foreign Relations
Macron Looks East
The French president’s visit to the 
Baltics offers an opportunity for 
closer coordination with  
Germany on Russia policy
Part of French President Emmanuel 
Macron’s European policy is to improve 
the position of his country in the East-
ern European member states of the 
European Union. Although this is not 
a change of strategy, but only a new 
method, it creates favorable conditions 
for intensified Franco-German dialogue 
on European strategic issues. 
France’s interest in the EU’s Eastern 
European countries is traditionally 
shared by Germany; the wish to devel-
op relations with all European part-
ners echoes the German commitment 
to EU cohesion. More specifically, a 
series of recent French foreign policy 
initiatives described below should be 
used to deepen the dialogue between 
Paris and Berlin on Russia policy and 
on the EU’s Eastern neighborhood, 
which is undergoing major upheav-
als. These are also vital security issues 
for the Baltic countries visited by the 
French president earlier this week. 
Macron’s  v is it  to L ithuania and 
Latvia, September 28–30,2020, high-
lighted both the potential and the 
limits of the French attempt to in-
crease its presence and influence in 
the EU’s East. The fact that he visit-
ed two of the main skeptics in the EU 
towards his Russia policy at a time 
when EU relations with Moscow are 
most strained not only allowed him 
to clarify his approach. The topics ad-
dressed and the scenography are also 
revealing of his expectations and his 
agenda concerning the strategic au-
tonomy of the European Union. Finally, 
Macron followed the “at the same 
time” method that has become the 
hallmark of his politics – and the 
source of many misunderstandings 
at home and abroad. In other words, 
he regularly adopts a priori contrary 
positions and in doing so claims to 
be synthesizing, while his opponents 
reproach him for a vague political 
positioning.
BOTH SOUTH AND EAST?
First of all, this French president – in 
contrast to his predecessors – is com-
mitted to speaking to all the member 
states of the Union, and not only to 
the bigger states or to France’s tradi-
tional partners like Germany or Italy. 
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Central Europe and the Baltic states 
have long been the forgotten areas 
of French diplomacy and it had been 
almost 20 years since a French pres-
ident had visited the Baltic region 
(the last French leader to do so was 
Jacques Chirac in 2001 before they be-
came EU member states). 
Macron is now trying to fill this gap 
and to engage in both the EU’s South 
and East in order to push forward his 
agenda on European sovereignty. This 
consists of developing European ca-
pabilities, not only in the field of de-
fense, but also in strategic areas such 
as energy and digital technology; the 
objective is to make the EU an auton-
omous actor, thus limiting as much as 
possible its dependence on China and 
the United States in particular. In this 
respect, the French president empha-
sized the convergence of interests 
on specific topics, such as the fight 
against cybercrime and disinforma-
tion, which represent a sensitive sub-
ject in both Baltic states. 
France’s  
commitment to 
Baltic security 
also strengthens 
Germany’s secu-
rity guarantee  
to this region
That said, France has neither the same 
network with nor the same geograph-
ic proximity to the East as it does with 
the South, and the diplomatic and 
political work of conviction and of in-
f luence is more challenging there. 
Moreover, the search for convergence 
in traditionally forgotten countries 
does not automatically mean a strong, 
long-term involvement of France in 
the region, or new comprehensive 
alliances.
BOTH EU’S STRATEGIC 
AUTONOMY AND NATO 
FOR BALTIC DEFENSE? 
On some topics related to strate-
gic autonomy, a gap separates France 
from the Baltic countries. This is par-
ticularly the case when it comes to 
defense issues. While the security of 
the Baltic states is guaranteed pri-
marily by NATO and the United States, 
in Vilnius the French president called 
for the development of autonomous 
European capabilities for the produc-
tion of defense equipment. Against the 
backdrop of shifting US foreign pol-
icy objectives, Macron’s aim was to 
encourage the Baltic leaders to think 
pragmatically about their future op-
tions. In parallel to NATO, Paris would 
like to see them also more involved in 
European defense structures – such 
as the European Intervention Initiative 
(EI2), instigated by France and creat-
ed in late 2018. As a matter of fact, the 
EI2 founding members included Esto-
nia, the Baltic country not visited by 
Macron during his tour, which already 
cooperates with the French military 
and security apparatus through its de-
veloped cyber capabilities.
Regarding the strategic autonomy 
of the EU, Macrons’ visit to Lithua-
nia and Latvia was also an opportu-
nity to clarify his position on NATO. 
His much-commented sentence on 
its brain death, in an interview with 
The Economist in November 2019, 
had worried in particular countries 
dependent on transatlantic defense 
structures, such the Baltic states. 
Therefore, (re)building confidence in-
volves reassuring them that France 
remains present and committed to 
their security, as well as to NATO 
structures. This is the signal Macron 
wanted to send by visiting the French 
contingent serving as part of a mul-
tinational NATO battlegroup in the 
Lithuanian town of Rukla. The bat-
tlegroup is part of the Alliance’s “En-
hanced Forward Presence,” which 
forms part of its collective defense 
posture on its eastern flank. 
Macron’s demands to the Europe-
ans, including the Baltic countries, 
are twofold: The first is to be more 
self-confident and strategic with-
in NATO; the second is to develop a 
European defense policy and thus re-
duce dependence on the Americans. 
The emphasis here is on complemen-
tarity and progressiveness. From the 
French point of view, the new instru-
ments and formats to be developed 
by the Europeans must not compete 
with NATO but contribute to it indi-
rectly. In other words, the European 
pillar of the Alliance should gradually 
be strengthened and allow Europe to 
act in the future, in some cases and if 
necessary, without the United States. 
This demand is driven by the convic-
tion that the American disinterest in 
Europe will continue well beyond the 
presidency of Donald Trump and that 
transatlantic relations are undergoing 
deep and lasting change. 
BOTH DETERMINA-
TION AND DIALOGUE 
WITH RUSSIA
Still, most attention during Macron’s 
Baltic tour was focused on his Rus-
sia policy announced a year ago with-
out any consultations with European 
partners, which caused irritation in 
many EU capitals, including Berlin.
As he expressed it in his speech to 
the French ambassadors in mid-
2019, President Macron was seeking a 
balanced position in relations with 
Russia: between strategic dialogue 
and firmness. On the one hand, he 
takes a hard line against President 
Vladimir Putin and calls out Russia’s 
destructive attitude toward the West. 
On the other hand, he offers Moscow 
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cooperation in selected areas of com-
mon interest, such as arms control, 
cybersecurity, and space research. He 
also hopes that Moscow might adopt 
a more constructive attitude in cri-
sis regions such as Syria and the Sahel 
zone, which are of strategic relevance 
to France’s foreign and security poli-
cy and where Russia could potentially 
cause destabilization.
Macron’s plan was to end Russia’s iso-
lation and alienation from Europe, and 
to limit its slide into China’s embrace. 
Talking to Moscow on a bilateral level was 
seen as a better means to achieve this 
goal than not talking at all, or waiting for 
a shift in the EU common position.    
However, a series of recent events, 
including the deterioration of EU’s 
re lat ions  wi th  Russ ia  a f ter  the 
attempted murder of opposition lead-
er Alexei Navalny seemed to make 
Macron’s approach increasingly unten-
able. After the Merkel-Macron talks in 
Brégançon on August 20, because of 
the poisoning of Navalny and of Rus-
sian support for Belarussian leader 
Alexander Lukashenko, Paris called off 
a meeting of French and Russian for-
eign and defense ministers scheduled 
for mid-September, along with tech-
nical discussions in 14 bilateral work-
ing groups. The official statement from 
Moscow claimed that the new date for 
these bilateral meetings will be consid-
ered once conditions improve.  
In these circumstances, President Ma-
cron’s visit to the Baltic countries was 
accompanied by a central question-
Does he still believe in strategic dia-
logue with the Kremlin? 
In Vilnius, the French president de-
fended his long-term approach of 
engaging Moscow on a structured se-
curity dialogue: “Our vision is that if 
we want to build a lasting peace on 
the continent we have to work with 
Russia,” he said. In talks with the Bal-
tic leaders, the Elysée wanted to 
discuss not only Baltic sensitivities vis-
à-vis Russia but also the best way for-
ward – “taking not only their interests 
but the European interests” into con-
sideration, according to Politico. In an-
other words, what has changed is not 
the substance of Macron’s approach 
to Russia but rather his tactics and se-
quencing, now adapted to the new re-
alities of EU politics and relations with 
Moscow.
Moreover, to improve engagement 
with his skeptical Baltic hosts, the 
French president was willing to send 
a strong message in support of mass 
protests in neighboring Belarus. Ahead 
of his trip, he told the Journal du 
Dimanche newspaper that “it’s clear 
that Lukashenko must go.” During his 
visit to Vilnius, he met with the exiled 
Belarussian opposition leader Sviatlana 
Tsikhanouskaya, who challenged Pres-
ident Lukashenko in the fraudulent 
elections in August. She said that Ma-
cron promised her that he would push 
for a more active EU role in the Belar-
us political crisis, and help secure the 
release of the political prisoners. She 
was also invited to deliver a speech in 
the French parliament. These moves 
pleased the Balts and allowed Macron 
to develop a new element in his pro-
posed dialogue: an offer to mediate be-
tween the Belarussian opposition and 
Russian President Putin. 
Macron promptly initiated a call to Pu-
tin on September 30, telling him that 
Tsikhanouskaya was open for dialogue 
with Russia and ‘encouraged President 
Putin to take it into consideration’, ac-
cording to the Elysée. In its readout of 
this call, the Kremlin said that Putin 
cautioned the French President against 
“any external attempts at interference 
or pressure on the legitimate state 
authorities” in Belarus. Both leaders 
agreed that the best way forward was 
to resort to mediation by the OSCE – 
something that Minsk has been refus-
ing to accept.  
GOOD MESSAGE FOR 
GERMANY AND EU 
COHESION 
In two main aspects, Emmanuel Ma-
cron’s message to the Baltic states will 
also be welcome in Berlin and points 
to favorable conditions for Fran-
co-German cooperation. Firstly, his 
determination to talk and to listen 
to all European partners, including 
the Baltic countries, echoes the Ger-
man commitment to guarantee the 
Zusammenhalt (cohesion) of the EU. 
More specifically, France’s commit-
ment to Baltic security also strength-
ens Germany’s security guarantee to 
this region. After the Russian annex-
ation of Crimea, Berlin made a stra-
tegic commitment to Baltic security 
and assumed a large role in reinforc-
ing NATO’s collective defense there, 
including as a lead nation of the NATO 
battlegroup in Lithuania.
Secondly, the French willingness to use 
the current pause in the strategic dia-
logue with Moscow to consult with EU 
partners, while being intransigent on 
respect for human rights and multilat-
eral rules, is a chance to intensify Fran-
co-German dialogue. There is no longer 
any realistic prospect of reducing EU 
sanctions on Russia. On the contrary, 
Moscow’s willingness to compromise 
over the conflict in eastern Ukraine is 
even more unlikely than before. 
There is a need to reconsider a com-
bination of incentives and pressure 
that can together alter the Kremlin’s 
behavior and calculus on issues that 
matter the most to Europeans. And 
as long as Berlin and Paris have no re-
al coordinated Russia policy, Mos-
cow will always be able to play one off 
against the other. Without a new coor-
dinated approach, the French bilateral 
dialogue with Moscow will be used by 
the Russian leadership to improve its 
own negotiating position on Europe-
an security – and to sow more discord 
among Europeans. Regardless of how 
many times President Macron talks to 
Eastern Europeans. 
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